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A Controversial Role Model for
Pakistani Women
Faiza Mushtaq
1 Al-Huda opened its first school of Islamic education in Islamabad in 1994. The institute
branched out to Lahore and Karachi over the next few years and by now its network has
grown to approximately 70 locations in urban areas all over Pakistan. More than 15,000
women1 have graduated with a diploma or certificate from one of Al-Huda’s courses while
many more attend these lessons without enrolling formally. In addition, classes under the
Al-Huda  banner  are  carried  out  amongst  Pakistani  diaspora  communities  in  North
America, Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. The founder and leader of this movement
is a woman called Dr. Farhat Hashmi2. Her teachings form the core of study in Al-Huda
classrooms and her  lectures  can attract  audiences  numbering  in  the  thousands.  Her
message and fame are carried far and wide through audio cassettes and CDs, books and
pamphlets, radio and television programs, and websites.
2 The curriculum at  Al-Huda focuses on the texts  of  the Quran and Hadith,3 including
translation  from  Arabic  into  Urdu  and  Hashmi’s  extensive  commentaries  on  their
meaning, historical context and contemporary relevance. These lessons train women so
they can understand and apply canonical Islamic teachings to their own lives, reform
themselves, and then share this knowledge with others (Hashmi 2006). Farhat Hashmi’s
interpretations are marked by the particular doctrinal stance that is identified as the Ahl-
i Hadith branch of Sunni Islam in South Asia. This is a puritanical school of thought that
rejects most customary practices and intermediaries to privilege foundational texts and
individual  religious responsibility.4 Hashmi also advocates non-religious education for
women,  preaches  the  value  of  scientific  reasoning  and  logic,  and  uses  modern
management and marketing tools in organizing Al-Huda. 
3 This  combination  of  old  and  new  forms  of  knowledge,  of  modern  and  traditional
approaches to religious practice, has attracted urban educated women from Pakistan’s
upper and middle classes. Many of them take up teaching and administrative positions
across Al-Huda’s organizational network, volunteer for its social welfare projects, or stay
involved with the group on an informal basis.  The wealthy amongst them also make
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sizable donations of money and property which sustain the movement. Enthusiastic Al-
Huda participants are animated by a deep admiration for Farhat Hashmi and by a desire
to emulate her exemplary qualities of scholarship and piety. However, their willingness
to accept her moral authority and alter their behavior is troubling for some of their
contemporaries.
4 In this paper, I explore how Farhat Hashmi comes to hold the status of a role model for
some women in Pakistan while others fail to be swayed by her appeal and are deeply
hostile to her reformist mission. The opening sections analyze the social backgrounds of
Hashmi as well as her support base, and are followed by a discussion of her opponents’
views.  Al-Huda  and  Hashmi  attract  criticism from amongst  various  social  groups  in
Pakistan but here I focus on two of the most vocal ones: the religious experts who have
traditionally been in charge of Islamic institutions of learning, and the urban secular-
liberal elites. 
5 My analysis highlights the central role of social relationships and the interactions that Al-
Huda students and teachers have with each other which convert them into Hashmi’s
committed followers. The leader does not achieve her authoritative standing through a
collection  of  static  personal  attributes.  Instead,  it  is  through  her  organizational
innovations that her qualities can be displayed in recurrent collective experiences, where
participants see her in action, feel the effects of authority, talk about it, and form bonds
with others around them. In other words, Al-Huda’s institutional activities are crucial in
turning Hashmi into a role model for her students and providing them with meaningful
routines to carry over into their day-to-day lives.
6 Hashmi has built  her appeal  by deliberately distancing and contrasting Al-Huda with
madrasas (Islamic religious schools) and other groups that provide Islamic education in
Pakistan.  Observers  of  Al-Huda  also  tend  to  highlight  the  ‘uniqueness’  of  its
accomplishments (Ahmad 2009:  1).  However,  the success of  this movement has to be
evaluated in light of its proximity to, and borrowings from, its contemporary rivals and
historical  predecessors.  This  context  shapes  the  expectations  and  judgments  formed
about the movement by supporters and opponents alike.
7 My analysis is built upon twenty months of fieldwork at Al-Huda branches in three cities
of Pakistan—Karachi,  Lahore and Islamabad—as well as a week spent with Al-Huda in
Toronto. These ethnographic observations are supplemented by formal interviews with
Farhat Hashmi, Al-Huda students and staff members, and other key informants, textual
material produced by Al-Huda, official records, and secondary literature.5
 
Leading by example
8 The official Al-Huda biographical sketch of its founder presents Farhat Hashmi as a figure
dedicated to the service of Islam and motivated by her love of learning. Hashmi was born
in Sargodha6 in 1957 as the eldest of twelve siblings, and she credits her father as being
the most important influence in her early life.  Abdur Rehman Hashmi was a lifelong
member and local leader of the Jama’at-i-Islami7, and he taught his children the Quran
and basic tenets of Islam at home. Farhat Hashmi herself was a head of the Jama’at’s
student wing while she attended college in Sargodha. She received a Masters degree in
Arabic from the University of Punjab in Lahore, and went on to marry a fellow student,
Idrees Zubair. Both of them then taught at the International Islamic University (IIU) in
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the capital city of Islamabad, before proceeding together to the University of Glasgow to
obtain their PhD degrees in Islamic Studies.  During this period,  they also traveled in
Turkey,  Jordan,  Syria,  Egypt  and  Saudi  Arabia,  visiting  libraries  and  meeting  with
prominent  Islamic  scholars.  Shortly  after  returning  to  Islamabad,  Hashmi  left  her
position at IIU and converted her informal Quran lessons in women’s homes into a full-
fledged institute, i.e. Al-Huda, offering year-long structured courses of study. Her husband
and daughters have also been involved with teaching at Al-Huda and have now followed
her to Toronto where the school has opened a large branch. 
9 Hashmi’s journey from the small provincial town of Sargodha to big cities like Lahore and
Islamabad would have been less likely a generation ago,  and was paved by Pakistani
women’s increasing access to higher educational opportunities in public-sector schools
like Punjab University and the International Islamic University.  Her life as a student,
teacher and administrator at these two institutions brought her into close contact with
the dominant social discourses and state-sanctioned forms of associational life. This was
the time of General Zia’s rule (1977-1988), when the Jama’at-i-Islami found official favor,
Arabic  training  was  encouraged  and  funded  by  the  state,  and  Saudi  Arabia  was  an
important source of patronage and normative guidance. The tentative gains in female
education and employment opportunities were confined to a few permissible fields and
remained conditional upon women’s acceptance of moral regulation (in their appearance,
conduct and spatial segregation) by male authority. 
10 Hashmi chose to distance herself from the Jama’at-i-Islami’s political agenda when she
launched her own teaching career, and the official narrative of her life makes no mention
of her own or her family’s links with the Jama’at.  Yet that early involvement clearly
helped shape her conviction that individual disciplining and righteous lifestyles are the
first step towards social reform, and exposed her to tools like study circles, pamphlets
and Islamic literature towards attaining that goal. Travel to the United Kingdom and the
Middle East gave Hashmi greater exposure to global networks of Islamic scholarship and
modern  pedagogical  methods,  both  of  which  have  a  clear  imprint  on  Al-Huda’s
organization. Her critiques of madrasa education and the practices of Shi’i8 and Barelwi9
groups show clear sectarian influences from Saudi ulama and the Ahl-i Hadith, but are
also shaped through interactions with the state and educational institutions in Pakistan.
11 There is nothing immediately striking about Hashmi’s personal appearance. She comes to
her classes in casual dress, with muted makeup and few items of jewelry, and covers her
head with a loosely-draped colored scarf matching her outfit.10 She is tall and heavy-set,
in her early fifties, and wears large round reading glasses. Outside school she is seen in
full hijab: an ankle-length black outer robe on the body and black scarf covering most of
the head and face (niqab or face veil), leaving only the eyes exposed. This is how she
appears to outsiders on television and in printed images,  and only women who have
attended a lecture or met her in some other capacity are familiar with her face. Her calm
and measured voice is thus a much more recognizable feature to anyone who has heard
one of her tapes or encountered a lecture on radio or television. Notably, men are also
included in this extended audience although they cannot physically attend her lectures. A
number of Al-Huda staff members confirmed that both male and female students register
for the distance-learning course, and male prison inmates occasionally send letters of
appreciation to the organization after being provided Hashmi’s tapes. There is a strand of
conventional Islamic reasoning that considers the female voice to be sexually arousing,
dangerous,  and subject  to  restrictions  (Mahmood 2005:  65-66,  Hirschkind 2006:  111),
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which is contravened by the public availability of Hashmi’s religious lectures for both
sexes.
12 Hashmi commanded the undivided attention of listeners in every large or small Al-Huda
group I observed. Audience members would be scribbling furiously in their notebooks in
an attempt to take down every word, or otherwise following along in their open books,
and it was rare to find signs of distraction. Hashmi delivers her lectures at a brisk pace in
conversational Urdu peppered with English words and phrases and interspersed with
fluently recited Arabic verses. Certain standard elements are present in every lecture:
urging devoted study of the Quran, Hadith and Arabic language; presenting lessons from
the life of the Prophet Muhammad and other figures from Islamic tradition; including
examples  from  current  affairs,  everyday  experiences  and  her  own  life;  inculcating
techniques of self-examination and virtuous conduct. 
13 Lambek  (1990:  25)  argues  that  mastery  of  abstract,  written  textual  knowledge  ‘is
necessary for wielding religious authority [but]… is far from sufficient’, and it makes the
bearer’s conduct subject to more stringent demands. Personal performance has to satisfy
community standards and ethical imperatives before it becomes legitimate, and is also
judged by the consequences it generates (Lambek 1990: 28-33). Similarly, many women in
Pakistan who spoke to me in interviews about the appeal of Al-Huda, singled out Farhat
Hashmi’s ability to communicate and connect with them in a way that other teachers and
religious leaders have not done. All bring some implicit or explicit comparisons to their
experiences with Al-Huda, including their school and college studies, childhood Quran
lessons or other interactions with maulvis (ritual prayer leaders), dars (Islamic lessons),
offered by Islamist parties and other women preachers, and televised or taped sermons
and books by well-known Islamic figures. 
14 Samar,11 a senior Al-Huda teacher in Karachi, explains how she had been reading various
translations of the Quran on her own and thought she knew her religion well, but ‘the
spirit’ had been missing. Once she heard Hashmi speak, she says, ‘it affected my heart
immediately’. She claims this is because ‘she speaks at your own intellectual level, I mean,
somebody who you could relate to… The Quran is of course a timeless book… she makes it
relevant for us’. Kiran, another Al-Huda graduate from Islamabad and current instructor
in Karachi, says she often used to go to class and feel that ‘Dr. Farhat is speaking about
me. That’s the feeling we all get. Like she knows something about me and what I’m going
through these days and this is why, exactly, she’s just speaking to me’. 
15 Praise  for  Hashmi’s  knowledge  is  commonly  accompanied  by  the  perception  of  her
sincerity,  leading  many  women  to  believe  that  she  is  only  giving  them  direct  and
transparent access to the word of God. If she had wanted to mislead them, according to
this logic, she would not have taught them Arabic, and they trust her interpretation of
the texts because they have some tools to judge it with. Mehnaz, a student and donor at
Al-Huda in Karachi, claims Hashmi has no ‘sectarian bias…, [has] complete openness to
anyone and everyone’, and this assessment is shared by many of my respondents. This
unifying theme in the face of sectarian conflict is a prominent part of Al-Huda’s pitch,
and is typical of Ahl-i Hadith (and other Salafi) groups (Meijer 2009). 
16 Al-Huda  women’s  testimonials  describe  their  newfound  ease  at  adopting  virtuous
practices, and cite similar transformations they have seen in multiple others. Frequently
used metaphors include being shown a mirror in which the flawed self becomes revealed,
and an opening of the heart after which God becomes closer. The most visible change in
these women involves their adoption of some form of veiling, and giving up practices like
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listening to music or watching entertainment shows on television.12 Bushra, who teaches
a weekly class at Al-Huda in Lahore, quoted this verse from the Quran: ‘I have made it
easy for you to take a reminder from the Quran: is there anyone to take this reminder?’
(54: 17). She reflected that ‘you have to be pure before you can take the reminder… that’s
what Dr. Farhat does for us, she interprets the Quran so purely for us, helps us relate to
the example of Rasul Allah [the Prophet of God, i.e. Muhammad]…, we get hooked’. This
dynamic,  according  to  her,  extends  from  individual  transformation  to  collective
experience, and becomes ‘the binding force between us… keeps us together’. Some of my
respondents  bring up the resistance and hostility  others  show towards Al-Huda,  and
explain it as a willful misunderstanding of Hashmi’s message. They sound confident that
once the skeptics listen to her attentively they will start to act differently, and will come
to share their moral concerns.
17 Hashmi is modest about her achievements, and shares the credits for Al-Huda’s success
with her followers: ‘It’s not like I have done this alone, it’s been a collective effort from all
of  us… it’s  the students  who open up new branches… I  just  go wherever I’m called’
(Hashmi 2006). She has explained her mission as wanting to ‘help others experience the
peace I felt by reading the Koran [sic]… When people benefit from something, they will be
drawn  to  it’  (Ali  2003).  She  promises  women  ‘both  spiritual  benefit  and  practical
guidance’ in her lessons (Gulf News 2002), and many of her supporters echo her words
when describing her influence. A number of women dwelt on the theme of discipline and
effort demanded by the grueling schedule of studies at Al-Huda which gradually becomes
rewarding. They mention how Hashmi gave them the confidence to go out and teach the
Quran, giving them the chance to lecture in class while they were her students. 
18 Sympathetic  observers  report  that  Hashmi’s  ‘soothing  style  articulates  a  message  of
personal reform. She reminds listeners of God’s mercy and forgiveness—in stark contrast
to the dire warnings of hellfire favored by some mullahs’ (Khan 2004), and that ‘hearing
Dr Hashmi is a cerebral experience… She is tolerant, abreast with what is going on in the
world today and most of all not racist at all’ (Karachian 1999). This praise often betrays
prior assumptions and comparisons against which Hashmi is judged: she is ‘a mild and
soft-spoken lady who has none of the fiery disposition that the uninformed liberals would
expect’ (Hussain 2000), and ‘herself speaks usually about broader concerns’ unlike other
women at religious gatherings (Hyat 2001).
 
The support base for Al-Huda
19 The influence of Al-Huda as a movement reaches some social groups in Pakistan more
readily than others. Gender is a dividing line, although men can access the teachings of
the group even if they cannot physically participate in its gatherings. The urban locations
of movement activities and the requirement of literacy place significant limits on who
can join. These two factors mediate the impact of women’s socio-economic backgrounds,
and decisively shape the boundaries of Al-Huda’s target audience.
20 The types  of  urban neighborhoods,  where Al-Huda activities tend to cluster,  contain
important demographic indicators. In Karachi for instance, these areas include Clifton
and Defence Housing Authority (DHA), which are by and large ‘inhabited by the elite of
the city… [comprising of] bureaucrats, politicians, business executives and industrialists’
(Hasan 1999: 169). Other popular locations are in PECHS,13 North Nazimabad, Federal B
Area,  and  Gulshan-i  Iqbal—‘predominantly  middle-income  residential  areas…  [where]
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most of the residents work as middle level functionaries in banks, offices, factories in the
city  centre,  the  port  or  in  the  industrial  estates’  (Hasan 1999:  169).  At  least  50% of
Karachi’s population is estimated to live in its unplanned informal settlements (Hasan
1999: 166), and there is no Al-Huda branch catering specifically to them. 
21 The list of Al-Huda locations in other Pakistani cities similarly ranges across upper- and
middle-income  neighborhoods.14 The  chosen  locations  target  residents  who  are  not
readily persuaded to leave their affluent enclaves and venture into other areas of their
city, whether for work or recreation. The reverse, however, is not true and some of the
women from poorer localities who do travel to Al-Huda branches have the option to stay
in attached hostels. There are differences of age and class background among Al-Huda
participants, and their composition is not as homogenous as it might appear from the
outside. Some of the women hail from wealthy families, and make sizable donations of
money and property to Al-Huda, others require financial support in order to afford these
classes,  and  many  are  simultaneously  engaged  in  other  educational  or  occupational
careers.
22 In the early years of Al-Huda’s diploma course, a bachelor’s degree was the minimum
qualification required of incoming students. This condition was relaxed over time as the
number of  course offerings and the pool  of  applicants expanded.  Now some Al-Huda
programs accept the intermediate degree that colleges in Pakistan confer after twelve
years of formal schooling, while others accept students who have completed ten years of
education and matriculated from high school. Considering that only 32% of Pakistan’s
total adult female population and 55% of urban women meet the criteria of basic literacy
(UNESCO 2004: 7), those who finish high school or above are still in a minority. 
23 The  wealthy  elites,  who  used  to  dominate  Al-Huda  gatherings  in  the  early  years—
professional women, as well as wives of senior military officials, government bureaucrats
and  industrialists—,  are  increasingly  joined  by  representatives  from  middle-income
urban groups. Members of the movement widely share a belief that they are part of an
‘educated class’,15 and thus responsible for setting the standards of moral conduct for the
rest  of  society.  Farhat  Hashmi’s  lectures  and  Al-Huda  class  sessions  frequently  cite
scriptural  sources  to  argue  that  those  who  possess  knowledge,  resources,  or  other
capabilities  also bear greater responsibilities  and accountability.  I  heard many of  my
respondents repeat the same line of reasoning to deflect criticism about Al-Huda’s elitism
and to justify differences of social class and status. Nasreen, a regional coordinator for the
organization in Karachi, claims they held programs in a five-star hotel only because the
spacious halls  could accommodate women ‘from all  walks of  life’  and,  moreover,  the
domestic servants some women brought in with them to listen to the Quran ‘would never
have entered that hotel  for any other reason’.  She continues:  ‘But rich and educated
people  are the  trend-setters,  you can’t  debate  that… if  a  woman in Lalukhet 16 starts
wearing the hijab… what impact will it have?’ Tahira, an associate of Hashmi’s from the
early days of Al-Huda in Islamabad, argues that the cultural endorsement and material
resources of elites are necessary to achieve the movement’s mission of widespread social
reform.
24 Al-Huda consists of urban, literate women who believe that their education sets them
apart from others in society whom they judge to be illiterate, rustic and morally suspect.
They are aware of differences in class and status within their own ranks, and read them
through  indicators  such  as  place  of  residence,  style  of  dress,  language—especially
command over English—and manner of speech. However, they also emphasize what they
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have in common as participants in the movement: their mastery of text-based knowledge,
the scholarly qualities of their leader Hashmi, and the discipline and moderation acquired
through their program of character training. Both the formal presentations and informal
conversations within the movement tend to portray condemned,  sinful  or un-Islamic
practices with connotations of backwardness, irrationality and parochialism. In contrast,
their  own  piety  and  religious  knowledge  are  marked  as  being  rational,  analytical,
scientific, literal and modern. In one sweep, they distance themselves from the religious
learning  of  the  madrasa  system  while  also  claiming  superiority  over  the  secular
educational institutions whose practices they validate. In other words, participation in
Al-Huda  provides  socially  recognized  symbolic  capital  to  those  who  are  desirous  of
improving their worldly status as well as to those who are already privileged. 
25 Social networks play an important role in disseminating information about Al-Huda. Most
of  my  respondents  heard  about  Hashmi  or  her  tapes  and  classes  through  relatives,
friends, neighbors or casual acquaintances. A majority of women attend their first Al-
Huda gathering because someone else suggests it or accompanies them to it. However,
their reasons for staying and for deciding to become more fully involved differ not only
from one person to the next but also over time for each individual. Women might join Al-
Huda classes because of the boredom, lack of personal fulfillment or elitist concerns that
some observers ascribe to them (e.g. Ali 2003, Matri 2003, Hyat 2001), but also due to a
variety  of  other  personal  motivations,  biographical  turning  points  or  circumstances.
What they learn through their interactions in these Al-Huda settings, and the ties they
form with other participants, create new sympathies, and shape the future course of their
increasing or decreasing involvement. This finding echoes the conclusions that Munson
(2002) reaches in his study of participants in the American pro-life movement. He shows
how some form of personalized contact through their social  networks initially draws
individuals to the movement, rather than any concerns over abortion or any pre-existing
pro-life beliefs. It is only after an initial period of activism that these individuals come to
understand and identify with a pro-life position, and develop into committed activists. To
understand why some individuals are mobilized and others are not, ‘both the focus on
individual attributes and on the [macro-level] political process are inadequate’ (Munson
2002: 6). 
26 It is also useful to remember Randall Collins’ (2001: 30) warning about ‘draw[ing] too
sharp a dichotomy between excitement-seeking…participants, and the ‘morally serious’
participants who come out of a deeper sense of need or dedication’. Instead, he sees a
continuum along which the ephemeral and the most deeply committed participants of
any movement are arrayed. I also found an ongoing, evolving process by which women’s
commitment towards Al-Huda’s goals is shaped, rather than a one-time decision or a
single underlying motivation for joining. Individual women bring with them a variety of
beliefs and expectations which end up getting modified, reinforced or unlearned through
their recurrent participation in group activities.  The communication of ideas and the
generation  of  emotional  bonds  are  both  crucial  mechanisms  in  helping  forge  new
concerns and new ways of acting. 
27 There  are  many  ways  in  which  the  effects  of  sustained  involvement  with  Al-Huda
manifest themselves in women’s self-perceptions, behavior patterns and social relations.
One important consequence of the classroom experience is to cast women from different
generations,  family  backgrounds  and  social  profiles  in  the  mold  of  students.  This  a
departure from the familial bonds and imagery common in some other Islamist groups
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where participants address each other as ‘sisters’ and ‘brothers’.17 Familial networks are
not  altogether  absent  from Al-Huda gatherings,  where  one  finds  many mothers  and
daughters, cousins or other such members of kin groups attending together. However, in
the classroom and across  the  Al-Huda network,  these ties  are  superseded by loyalty
towards Hashmi, and women come to relate to each other as fellow students. They look
up to Hashmi not as a maternal figure but as a scholar and teacher they all share. The
alternative community thus created is fired up by a zeal and higher purpose, and it can
potentially override members’ other social relations or obligations. The students willingly
subject  themselves  to  the  demands  and  discipline  of  study,  and  I  witnessed  many
classroom interactions where the request for more homework assignments or additional
study sessions was put forward by students rather than teachers. Many women cite the
active  and  engaged  participation  of  students  and  the  chance  to  learn  the  Quran
collectively, not alone at home, as adding to Al-Huda’s appeal.
 
The ulama’s response to dangerous innovations
28 The ulama18 in Pakistan have been vocal in their opposition to Farhat Hashmi and her
work with Al-Huda. They often refer to Hashmi as a new fitna—an Arabic term used in the
Quran and in Islamic discourse to convey multiple shades of meaning, including discord,
trial, mischief and sedition. Many prominent ulama have written and spoken in public
forums against her, and have issued formal opinions (fatwas) in response to questions and
concerns  raised  by  their  followers.  They  cast  Al-Huda’s  activities  as  dangerous  and
corrupting, and forbid others from attending any of its classes, from listening to Hashmi’s
tapes  or  consuming  Al-Huda  literature,  and  from  supporting  the  organization  by
providing publicity or funds. 
29 These  ulama’s  opinions19 take  it  for  granted  that  universities  in  the  West  carry  out
dubious research on Islam, with the aim of marginalizing traditional Islamic scholarship
and the role of religion in public life. In this view, Farhat Hashmi’s PhD degree from a
university in Glasgow under supervision from non-Muslims does more to discredit her
than to certify her expertise or authority for interpreting core Islamic texts. They believe
her teaching is dangerous because she can corrupt one’s entire faith by introducing even
one  wrong  belief  or  insidious  thought.  In  rejecting  Hashmi’s  authority,  the  ulama
explicitly invoke the weight of their own qualifications and the historical evolution of
their  role  as  guardians of  sacred knowledge.  They compare their  lifelong specialized
training to the highly skilled work of professionals like doctors, engineers and lawyers,
and point out how absurd it  would be for laymen to start  practicing in those fields.
Neither Hashmi nor her students at Al-Huda have gone through the required eight-year
basic course of study (dars-i Nizami) taught in South Asian madrasas, and these critics are
especially offended by Al-Huda women who start teaching the Quran after a one- or two-
year short course. They find the method of teaching at Al-Huda to be problematic as it
relies only on direct translation of the Quran, ignoring the technical principles of Arabic
grammar and rhetoric, Islamic theology and jurisprudence, and the scholarly opinion,
debates and consensus developed over 1400 years of intellectual history (Abu Safwan
2003:  40-56).  The ulama claim that they are carrying on the tradition of  the Prophet
Muhammad in providing guidance to Muslims through their exemplary practice, while
Hashmi practices a religion of expediency, convenience and fabrications (Shabbir 2009).
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30 Hashmi’s conduct as a woman is  a deeply troubling and ever-present concern in the
writings of these ulama and their followers. They condemn her for not obeying the norms
of modesty (purdah), pointing out her inappropriate appearances on the media—where
she lets her voice be heard by male strangers—and international travel without a proper
male  escort  (Abu  Safwan  2003:  112-5).  They  disagree  strongly  with  Hashmi’s
interpretation of Islamic custom that allows women to pray at a mosque rather than in
the privacy of  their  homes,  and use voluminous scriptural  and scholarly citations to
prove her views wrong. Other unorthodox prescriptions, in their view, include allowing
women to offer their ritual prayers in the same style as men, to lead those prayers, and to
recite the Quran during the menstrual period (Shabbir 2009,  Abu Safwan 2003).  They
object to Al-Huda’s encouragement of women’s work outside the home, even if the work
involves spreading a religious message, and chastize them for allowing male teachers in
front of women with covered faces but without a physical barrier dividing the classroom.
Some are critical of Hashmi for not taking on her husband’s last name, and accuse her of
presenting all aspects of her own example as the authoritative model for women.
31 These ulama’s vehement rejection of Al-Huda stems from a belief that only certain kinds
of knowledge are appropriate for women. They expect the general population of Muslims
to acquire only the fundamentals of Islamic knowledge covering rituals and obligations,
and assign fathers and husbands the responsibility for ensuring that their female wards
obtain this learning (Abu Safwan 2003: 47-60). They believe it is especially dangerous for
women to attempt the translation and explanation of the Quran because of their limited
understanding, and pointedly advise that women confine themselves to matters covered
in the Bihishti  Zewar20 (Abu Safwan 2003: 60).  This hostility towards Al-Huda women’s
religious education is compounded by a suspicion of their privileged backgrounds, and
many  of  the  ulama pour  scorn  on  Al-Huda  gatherings  as  superficial  meetings  of
fashionable women. They believe that the attractive presentation of religion at fancy
locations  is  all  that  appeals  to  these  women;  the  moral  and  spiritual  benefits  of
instruction in mosques and madrasas are thought to be missing from the ‘clubs and
hotels’ where they hold their classes (Abu Safwan 2003: 68). 
32 These contestations are valuable in helping to chart the limits of Hashmi’s authority by
revealing where her personal and organizational claims are effective and where they fall
short. The opposition from a male, professional class of religious experts is in many ways
a struggle over who should be allowed to speak for the Islamic tradition. Material and
symbolic resources are both at stake, as the ulama’s mosques and madrasas compete for
the same pool of private philanthropic funding that Al-Huda draws from. Both sides share
many core beliefs  and assumptions  about  the centrality  of  Islamic  knowledge in the
regulation  of  everyday  life,  and  dispute  the  finer  details  in  their  interpretation  of
religious texts and practices.21 These competing claimants to Islamic religious authority
hold each other to be in error, and ‘the exaggeration of small differences… [turns] into
emblems of group difference’ (Collins 2001: 38).
 
The liberal critique of an outdated orthodoxy
33 In contrast to the traditionalist critics of Al-Huda, there are Pakistani men and women
who  are  troubled  more  by  Hashmi  and  her  followers’  appropriation  of  the  Islamic
tradition  than  by  their  modern  pedagogical  or  organizational  practices.  Their
fundamental objection is to the philosophy of this movement that seeks social reform
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through the enforcement of religious practice and morality. Using arguments inspired by
feminism, secular liberalism and alternative understandings of Islam, they criticize Al-
Huda on two counts: its dogmatic approach towards religion and limiting prescriptions
for women. The urban, educated, upper- and middle-class profile of this group is similar
to the backgrounds of most Al-Huda members, and Hashmi’s credentials as a woman with
a doctoral education do not disqualify her in their eyes as they do for the ulama. Instead
this  dispersed  group  of  detractors  challenges  her  moral  narrative,  the  value  of  her
contribution to women’s lives, and her overstepping the bounds of scholarly authority. 
34 These commentators highlight the proximity of Hashmi’s interpretation of the Quran to
conservative traditions within Islam, and the unquestioning acceptance of her views by
her followers. Kamal (2001) describes herself as an educated woman from a ‘Muslim Sufi
background’ who ‘cannot accept that a single person can be the repository of so much
diverse  knowledge,  wisdom  and  expertise’.  She  is  perturbed  by  the  ‘zeal  and  self-
righteousness’ of Al-Huda attendees ‘spouting Farhat Hashmi’s utterances as if they were
the definitive word on Islam’ (Kamal 2001). Another self-described Sufi Muslim woman
(Koonj  2005)  laments  the ‘closing of  interpretive theological  space’  that  results  from
Hashmi’s  claim  to  speak  directly  from  God’s  words.  This  ‘anti-intellectual’  stance,
according to the blogger Koonj, can lead to dangerous over-simplifications that pit those
who  are  with  Hashmi  against  all  others  who  are  ‘against  God’.  Others  echo  the
observation that Hashmi ‘fails to recognize the essential flexibility of Islam, and that she
is engaged more in developing a cult than encouraging a true understanding of religion’
(Hyat 2001). Some suspect Hashmi of enriching herself and her family through financial
manipulation while others blame her for creating disruptive changes in her followers’
lifestyles and views, leading to broken marriages and households. 
35 Some observers worry whether Al-Huda’s  conservative Islamic activism could lead to
endorsement of, or participation in, radical forms of Islamic extremism. Obaid-Chinoy
(2005)  presents  Al-Huda classes  as  a  form of  brainwashing,  where ‘students  nod and
murmur in agreement’ and wall posters quoting Quranic passages give ‘instruction on
how Muslims should live their lives – guidance on when to smile, cry, tell the truth, when
to be angry’. Like the ulama, this group of critics is disdainful towards the religiosity of
rich Al-Huda women and suspects that their search for meaningful activities is just a
passing fad, now that ‘they have had their sleeveless blouses and coffee parties’ (Ali 2003).
Many complain that these women adopt rituals without grasping their meanings, and are
obsessed only with trivial  concerns—‘issues like sitting or standing during a milad [a
religious ceremony] or wearing nail polish during namaz [ritual prayer]’ (Ibrahim 2001).
They mock women who start wearing new styles of head and body covering for their
shallow understanding of pious norms: ‘Certainly, the ‘hijab’, often involving intricately
wrapped headscarves, is more fashionable than going into ‘purdah’ or seclusion’ (Hyat
2001). 
36 The practice of veiling and segregation leads critics to believe that Al-Huda is teaching
women to ‘accept outdated gender roles’ (Obaid-Chinoy 2005). They argue that Al-Huda
classes offer a false sense of comfort and sisterly community, making it difficult for the
members to recognize or feel  outrage against the oppression faced by less privileged
women.  Kamal  (2001)  believes that  women’s  activism cannot be meaningful  unless  it
tackles ‘the real problems faced by Pakistani women: death in the marital home, usurped
inheritance,  honor killings,  trafficking of women, violence against women and sexual
harassment’. While the ulama mostly disagree with the methods and female composition
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of Al-Huda, these liberal critics take issue with the very goals of the movement. For some
of them, acquiring religious knowledge and individual self-discipline are not worthwhile
objectives at all, while others believe that a moral awakening is complete only if its leads
to a larger social good. 
37 An inflammatory opinion frequently attributed to Hashmi is her acceptance of polygamy
as a Muslim man’s right and,  more specifically,  her encouraging women to ‘let  their
husbands marry a second time so ‘other sisters can also benefit’’ (Daily Times 2005). Many
of  the secular-liberal  and moderate Muslim elites in Pakistan are skeptical  about Al-
Huda’s followers and what they perceive as misogynistic and self-righteous attitudes.
These critics are ready to believe that Hashmi preaches women’s subservience to their
husbands. Hashmi, on the other hand, is keen to attract recruits from within this social
group by presenting herself as a liberal and feminist interpreter of Islam. She explicitly
denies accusations of advocating polygamy (Obaid-Chinoy 2005), and claims that she is
protecting women’s rights by arguing that the Quran orders a man to marry a woman
with whom he has an illegal sexual affair.  She frequently protests that her teachings
inform women about the rights and dignity that Islam grants them (Obaid-Chinoy 2005,
Ibrahim 2001). Hashmi’s critics deploy a discourse of universal human rights to judge her
leadership, and find it wanting in standards of morality as well as modernity. Al-Huda
fails  to  impart  the  ‘expansive,  enlightened  and  empowering’  message  of  the  Quran,
according  to  Hassan  (2002),  who  dismisses  Hashmi’s  ‘modernist’,  ‘liberalizing’  and
‘feminist’ positions as mere public statements.
 
Creating avenues for mobilization and reform
38 Al-Huda’s focus on study of the Hadith and understanding the Quran in its original Arabic
is coupled with an emphasis upon judging one’s own self and others in light of normative
principles distilled from these texts. The significance of the movement’s achievement lies
in making a standard repertoire of  reformist  concerns—shared with the Ahl-i  Hadith
tradition  of  Islam—relevant  and  meaningful  enough  for  these  women  that  it  starts
shaping their actions. 
39 Sadaf Ahmad (2009)’s anthropological study of Al-Huda women in Islamabad recognizes
the movement’s ability to shape members’ ideas, conduct and relationships, but explains
these changes with reference to individual biographies and large-scale cultural processes.
In this account, exposure to Al-Huda’s discourse can transform these individual women’s
subjectivities because they already possess the relevant cultural codes and values. What is
missing in this  explanation is  the institutional  moorings and collective dimension of
cultural change. This is a limitation of the ‘framing’ approach (Snow et al 1986), which
suggests that a social movement will find ready adherents if it frames its interpretations
to resonate  with pre-existing sets  of  beliefs.  Mumtaz Ahmad (2010)’s  examination of
Farhat Hashmi’s ideas and authority, on the other hand, finds her sophisticated use of
electronic media to be a primary reason for her success. Yet, the television appearances
or tapes and CDs have a limited transformative impact on their own. The process of
learning to  emulate  a  role  model  and insert  her  teachings  into  one’s  own life  is  an
ongoing and painstaking one, and is facilitated in the group settings and face-to-face
interactions in Al-Huda classrooms. It is through these ties of fellowship and loyalty to a
group through which women can sustain their moral commitments, and feel themselves
to be part of an authoritative consensus.
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40 There  are  numerous  practices  and  techniques  employed  in  Al-Huda  classrooms  that
produce these results, for instance tailoring the commentary and illustrations towards
the practical  concerns and experiences of  each specific  audience,  eliciting the active
participation of students, and building supportive ties between them. Students learn to
apply textual lessons to their own lives and engage in constant self-examination through
devices that can be carried outside the classroom and inserted into daily routines, such as
cassettes and duas (supplications, prayers) for various occasions. Course packets include
checklists with a series of questions for periodic self-analysis, covering personal ethics,
social relations, and religious obligations.22
41 Several other providers of Islamic education in Pakistan—who are not part of the ulama
fraternity nor trained in madrasas—have been active long before Al-Huda appeared on
the scene. In addition to Jama’at-i-Islami’s religious lessons and study circles, there have
been pioneering individuals,  like Dr. Israr Ahmad and Maulana Tahirul Qadri (Ahmad
2010,  Phillipon 2006) who have made some space for women in their non-traditional
Islamic teaching institutes.  One of  the ways in which Al-Huda stands out from these
competitors  is in  its  borrowing  of  structures  and  practices  from  formal  education:
dedicated  campus  buildings,  admission  and  registration  requirements,  testing  and
grading of students, awarding of diplomas and certificates, teacher training and fixed
syllabi.  Farhat  Hashmi’s  success  is  partly  due  to  her  timing,  i.e.  in  tapping  into  the
experiences and expectations of  Pakistani  women as  they gained increased access  to
higher education over the 1980s and 1990s. Al-Huda’s competitive advantage might not
last very long as its rivals are already adapting and selectively emulating its methods.
These include some former Al-Huda students,  one of  Farhat  Hashmi’s  sisters  (Nighat
Hashmi), and other female instructors who have launched programs of religious study for
women in Pakistani cities and who often consciously model themselves and their Islamic
courses on Hashmi’s example.
42 Farhat Hashmi is a significant female authority figure because the number of women in
contemporary Pakistan holding doctoral degrees or leadership positions is still limited
but, even more so, because she has acted as a ‘cultural entrepreneur’ (DiMaggio 1982) to
create a viable social movement through which her religious ideas get disseminated. The
critical reception for the movement and its female leader underscores just how unusual it
is  in  the  history  of  South  Asian  Islam for  women  to  take  up  positions  of  religious
authority.
43 Traditional institutions of  Islamic learning and scholarly networks across the Muslim
world have historically been dominated by men, with women rarely having access to
scholarly credentials or formal positions of authority. Separate madrasas for women in
the Indian Subcontinent are a recent, post-colonial innovation, and are subsidiary units
of  organizations  run  by  men.  Muslim  women,  who  have  held  positions  of  religious
leadership, have instead relied more easily upon charismatic authority, and Kalmbach
(2008:  38,  41-42)  points  to  a  long  history  of  female  mystics  who  have  headed  Sufi
networks  and  been  entitled  to  inherit  charismatic  saintliness.  In  her  study  of
contemporary Islamic activists in Syria,  she finds that ‘the authority of  many female
instructors is based more on reputation, teaching experience and personal style than on
formal  religious  training’  (Kalmbach  2008:  44).  Family  connections  are  particularly
important for many of these women who benefit from the recognition and status that
other (usually male) family members enjoy. Mahmood (2005: 65) similarly points out the
lack  of  formal  training  for  many  women  teaching  in  Cairo’s  contemporary  mosque
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movement, claiming that ‘the ability to practice da’wa [religious outreach] has come to
depend not so much on doctrinal expertise as on one’s moral uprightness and practical
knowledge of the tradition’.
44 Hashmi invokes familiar forms of authority by mentioning her family background and
asserting her personal  moral  probity,  but displays her formal educational  credentials
even more prominently. Unlike many contemporary Islamic activists, she claims she can
interpret and teach Islamic texts based not just on her practical knowledge but also on
her years of study and research on Islam. Gaffney (1994: 30-35) argues that each title used
for a contemporary Islamic teacher or preacher denotes a different local conception of
knowledge (ilm), conveying the specific functions, degree of activism and social standing
attached  to  that  religious  specialist.  The  Al-Huda  movement  literature  emphasizes
Hashmi’s doctoral degree, and she is widely addressed by her title of ‘Dr. Farhat Hashmi’,
23 linking her to specialized forms of modern knowledge and the prestige associated with
them.  Many  of  her  followers  are  as  impressed  by  her  citation  of  multiple  scholarly
references as they are by her accessible idiom and ability to switch between Urdu, English
and Arabic languages when she is delivering a lecture. 
45 Modernists, Islamists, Tablighis24 and many others argue against the ulama’s monopoly of
Islamic  learning  based  on  the  assumption  that  every  individual  has  the  capacity  to
understand and apply religious teachings. Hashmi has also adopted that line of reasoning
and preaches it to her followers. In addition, she believes her own authoritative standing
is  enhanced  by  her  specialized  academic  training  and  participation  in  transnational
scholarly networks, enabling her to attack rivals’ interpretations and the structures in
which their  learning is  embedded.  The very public  context  in which her teaching is
conducted—classrooms,  cassette  recordings,  media  appearances—is  a  departure  from
traditional patterns of women providing religious instruction to other women in homes
and private spaces.  Men are in charge of  the curriculum and administration at most
madrasas for girls in India (Winkelmann 2005) and Pakistan (Farooq 2005), and at the
helm of Islamist movements with women’s wings like the Jama’at-i-Islami. In contrast,
the key decision-making roles at Al-Huda are all  filled by women. Hashmi’s husband,
Idrees Zubair, has been involved with Al-Huda from the beginning as a board member and
teacher, but she is primarily responsible for the choices and the energy that have shaped
the movement. In spite of this autonomy and absence of direct male control, there are
gender-specific  limitations  that  this  women’s  movement  has  to  either  negotiate  or
accept.
46 Like other women venturing into public life,  Hashmi has to strike a delicate balance
between assertiveness in carving out new opportunities and compliance with existing
norms  of  gender  relations  in  Pakistan.  Her  strict  observance  of  public  veiling  and
frequent  invocations  of  her  own  responsibilities  as  a  mother,  wife  and  daughter
underscore  her  conformity  with  conservative  social  conventions.  Nonetheless,  as  I
showed above, her position leaves her open to attacks from both sides of the gender
debate—from those who interpret it as a radical rupture of the status quo, and others who
believe she is doing nothing to challenge women’s subordination. 
47 The organization of Al-Huda gatherings as female-only spaces, outside domestic or kin-
based arenas, has provided many women the opportunities for mobility, sociability and
leadership positions that were otherwise not available to them. By claiming to know more
about Islam and citing authoritative religious texts in their original Arabic form, these
women  try  to  exert  influence  over  male  and  female  members  of  their  families  and
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communities,  regardless  of  their  age or  customary positions.  There are limits  to the
authority these women can claim in the religious sphere, and certain roles that have been
traditionally performed by male religious experts are still reserved for men, i.e. delivering
the Friday sermon or the call to prayer, or officiating as a prayer leader for men. Al-Huda
opens up new possibilities of action and of imagining womanhood by introducing elite,
educated  women  into  structures  of  transmitting  Islamic  religious  learning  and
encouraging them to lead busy, active public lives as moral agents. Whether they end up
supporting  liberal,  feminist  visions  of  women’s  liberation  or  undermining  them,  the
changes wrought by this movement are already disrupting existing power relations and
institutional arrangements in Pakistan. 
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NOTES
1. Al-Huda does not share official enrollment or attendance figures. My calculation is based upon
interviews, my own visits to various sites, secondary accounts, and documents from early years
of the organization.
2. Hashmi, Farhat interview by author, 17 August 2006, Toronto.
3. The  deeds  and sayings  of  the  Prophet  Muhammad,  considered  an  authoritative  source  of
guidance in Islamic jurisprudence.
4. This stance has also been described as Wahhabism—the official ideology of the Saudi Arabian
state—and Salafism, a label for movements that seek to emulate the earliest community of Islam.
These  labels  are  contentious  as  they frequently  entail  accusations  of  extremism and foreign
influence, and erasures of local histories.
5. The doctoral dissertation in sociology on which this article is based (Mushtaq 2010) contains a
detailed discussion of data and methods.
6. An agricultural and trading town in the Punjab province of Pakistan.
7. An  Islamist  party  in  Pakistan  which  participates  in  national  politics,  and  has  an  urban
following. It was founded in India in 1941 by the influential ideologue, Syed Abul Ala Maududi.
8. A community of Muslims that forms a substantial minority in Pakistan where Sunni Muslims
are the dominant majority.
9. One of the sub-divisions within Sunni Islam in South Asia, opposed by other Sunni factions like
the Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith. Barelwis emphasize devotion to the Prophet Muhammad as
well as other saints and spiritual mediators, and participate in rituals of shrine worship, music,
singing and popular celebrations.
10. The outfit consists of a qamiz (long tunic) and shalwar (baggy trousers) that is standard attire
for Pakistani women. The scarf is referred to as either a dupatta or chadar (a long unstitched piece
of cloth, diaphanous or opaque) which can be draped around the shoulders or over the head and
shoulders.
11. Names of all interviewees have been changed to preserve confidentiality.
12. See Ahmad (2009) for stories of altered lifestyles and family relations for individual women as
a result of their involvement with Al-Huda in Islamabad.
13. Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society. The acronym is more widely used.
14. E.g. in Lahore these are: Defence, Cavalry Grounds, Gulberg, Model Town, Johar Town, Iqbal
Town, Shadman, Nespak, and Westwood. 
15. They use both the English term and a roughly equivalent one in Urdu: ‘parha likha tabqa’.
Expressions like these are common outside the movement as well, and signify the social, cultural
and economic privileges that access to formal education can grant in stratified Pakistani society.
Shaheed  (2002:  168)  reports  that  the  majority  of  Pakistani  women  in  a  national  survey  see
‘inadequate  or  no  education…  as  a  basic  reason  for  women’s  oppressed  condition.  Women
therefore value and seek education as an enabling factor and as an end in itself’. 
16. The  old  name  of  a  lower-middle  class  Karachi  neighborhood  (currently  Liaqatabad)
figuratively associated with backwardness.
17. Al-Huda women tend to address each other by their names, and refer to Farhat Hashmi using
terms such as ‘Dr. Farhat’ and ustazah (female teacher).
18. Religious scholars (usually male) with formal training in Islamic subjects who are qualified to
teach but also perform a variety of legal, advisory, ritual and other functions.
19. Originally published in Urdu-language Islamic journals, like Zarb-e-Momin and Al-Balagh, or
issued  by  the  fatwa  departments  of  prominent  madrasas  like  Darul  Uloom  Korangi,  Jamia
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Farooqia and Jamiat al-Ulum al-Islamiyya, Binori Town. These Karachi-based publications and
institutions are all representative of the Deobandi school of thought in South Asian Sunni Islam.
20. Bihishti Zewar (Heavenly Ornaments) is a popular advice manual for Muslim women, written
in the early 20th century by Ashraf Ali Thanawi (1863-1943).
21. Despite some affinities between the Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadis schools of thought, as Ahmad
(2009)  suggests  in  her  account  of  Al-Huda,  there  are  serious  and  enduring  lines  of  conflict
between these two groups in South Asian history. The heated denunciations of Hashmi by her
Deobandi critics pick on many of her signature Ahl-i Hadis positions. It is worth noting though,
that  most  Al-Huda  participants  come  from  lay  backgrounds  and  are  not  aware  of  these
theological divides or sectarian labels that are attached to certain ritual practices and beliefs.
22. See chapter three of Mushtaq (2010) for an in-depth analysis of Al-Huda’s organizational
practices and classroom learning activities.
23. The title is frequently used by popular male preachers in Pakistan and India like Dr. Israr
Ahmed or Dr. Zakir Naik who are qualified as medical doctors.
24. Members of the Tablighi Jamaat, a grassroots Islamic proselytizing movement of lay Muslims
that began in India in the 1920s and now has a loosely networked global presence. 
ABSTRACTS
Al-Huda is a movement of Islamic education and reform with a dedicated female following in
Pakistani cities. Its founder and leader is a woman, Dr. Farhat Hashmi, who has become a well-
known public figure in Pakistan. This paper explores how Hashmi derives her authority, displays
it, and defends it against challenges. Women who become active participants in her classes claim
she transforms their understanding of Islam and inspires them to change their lives. However
she is criticized by the secular-liberal elites of the country and by the traditional male leadership
of Islamic institutions, who question her religious expertise and are uncomfortable with the role
of both gender and class in this movement. This analysis highlights the collective interactions
and  organizational  innovations  through  which  Hashmi’s  teachings  acquire  an  authoritative
status for selected women.
INDEX




Visiting Research Fellow, Collective for Social Science Research, Karachi
A Controversial Role Model for Pakistani Women
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 4 | 2010
17
